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Peace Processes in Aceh and Sri 
Lanka: A Comparative Assessment 
Damien Kingsbury 
The 2004 tsunami provided a catalyst for peace talks over the separatist conflict in Aceh, 
Indonesia, leading to its eventual resolution in 2005.  As Aceh was going to peaceful elections 
in 2006, Sri Lanka, which had also been affected by the tsunami, appeared to be returning to 
full-scale separatist war.  This article assesses some of the underlying similarities and 
differences between the conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka.  Within this, it will touch upon claims to 
self-determination, human rights and political participation, representation, transparency and 
accountability, more commonly referred to as 'democracy'.  In particular, it will acknowledge 
these values as both challenges to the (restrictive) state, and the means of securing (non-
restrictive) state cohesion.  Originating in the local and specific, these claims necessarily 
transcend the local and come to reflect elements of the normative global.  In more concrete 
terms, the Aceh conflict was largely resolved by introducing greater local autonomy within a 
more democratic space.  This paper similarly proposes that a resolution to the Sri Lanka conflict 
can only come about through the introduction of greater autonomy and democratic plurality.  
However, with conceptual and strategic hostility growing between Sri Lanka's conflicting parties, 
it appeared that such resolution was likely only after further protracted bloodshed.   
On 24 December 2004, a massive earthquake in the Indian Ocean off the 
west coast of northern Sumatra triggered a tsunami that devastated much of 
the coastlines in the region.  The two worst affected areas were the 
Indonesian province of Aceh in northern Sumatra, and the east and south 
coasts of Sri Lanka, predominantly ethnic Tamil areas.  Both areas had for 
decades been involved in separatist conflict.  In Aceh, the Free Aceh 
Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka – GAM) declared independence from 
Indonesia in 1976,1 and in late 2004 was fighting the most bitter campaign of 
the subsequent conflict.  In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(Tamil Tigers, or LTTE), also founded in 1976,2 were two years into a 
ceasefire with the Government of Sri Lanka.  If the tsunami was not the 
reason for renewing peace talks over Aceh, it did provide considerable 
incentive to achieve a resolution to the conflict that was formally achieved on 
15 August 2005.  However, while Aceh was enjoying its first full year of 
peace, the security situation after the tsunami in Sri Lanka deteriorated 
despite a formal ceasefire agreement, and by the end of 2006 the country 
was again engaged in open war.   
                                                 
1
 H. Di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary by Hasan di Tiro, Ontario, The Open 
Press, 1984.   
2
 N. Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, 7th ed, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa 
Publications, 2006, esp. chapter 3 regarding early Tamil militancy.   
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How to incorporate multiple ethnicities has probably been the most serious 
challenge facing post-colonial states.  This raises the question of national 
identity, the success or otherwise of imposed national identities, and the 
correspondence between national identity and successful state 
management.  It assumes that a ‘nation’ is a bonded political group, while 
the ‘state’ is a spatially defined set of continuing institutions, and ‘country’ 
describes the geographic quality of the state.      
This article assesses the similarities and differences between the conflicts in 
Aceh and Sri Lanka, with emphasis on how peace was able to be achieved 
in one while the other moved away from relative peace towards open 
conflict.  It then asks if peace was able to be achieved in Aceh in what were 
in some respects similar circumstances, what options might there be for 
peace in Sri Lanka.   
Conceptions of Nation and State 
The idea of ‘nation’ may be contested, especially in cases of ethnic 
separatism, but there is broad agreement around its key components.  They 
correspond to a group of people that cohere around and define their political 
interests in common.  The idea of nation generally manifests itself as support 
for the creation, continuation or strengthening of an idea of a common 
bonded identity, an assertion of independent unity and, usually, self-
determination.3  These criteria can be seen to apply to both Aceh and the 
Tamil areas of Sri Lanka (referred to here as Eelam).  Means of creating or 
attempting to create such a common political identity usually revolve around 
a common language, more broadly shared cultural values, world view 
(weltanschauung) or ideology, and sets of myths and history,4 often involving 
a common hero or heroes as the national archetype and, not infrequently, in 
response to a commonly perceived threat or struggle for liberation.  These 
apply to Aceh and Eelam.  Other qualities of nation can include having a 
reasonably compact territory, a capable and energetic intellectual class, all 
of which help but are not absolutely necessary.5   
The state, as it is generally understood in the contemporary sense, refers to 
a specific and delineated area in which a government exercises political and 
judicial authority, and claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
(potential or actual violence).  In this, the spatial quality of the state ‘is 
integral to its functions and agencies’.6  That is, the area of the state defines 
                                                 
3
 See W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1994; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, New York, Verso, 1991; A. Smith, 
‘State-making and Nation-building’, in J. Hall (ed.), States in History, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1986; A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1986; A. Smith, 
Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; E. 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983.  
4
 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 13-18; Gellner, op. cit., p. 44.  
5
 Gellner, op. cit, p. 46.  
6
 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 235.  
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the functional sovereign reach and integration of its embedded7 'explicit, 
complex and formal' agencies;8 it defines the geographic material quality and 
quantity of the state.  The establishment of borders implies a state’s 
complete authority up to the limits of its borders.  A ‘state’ may be confluent 
with, but is analytically distinct from, a ‘nation’.  Within a given territory, the 
state can be identified by the presence and activities of its institutions, which 
define the functional capacity of the state.  Both Indonesia and Sri Lanka 
conform to these definitions of ‘state’, while Eelam and Aceh have claimed to 
also conform to such definitions, in contravention of the state claims of Sri 
Lanka and Indonsia, respectively.   
In cases where there are self-conceptualizing and largely exclusive political 
communities (‘nations’) within the state, tensions may arise between the 
interests of such political communities and the interests that are asserted on 
behalf of the state.  Such tensions arise in particular where there are claims 
to separate state status by political communities, which are in effect claims 
to national self-determination, such as in Eelam and Aceh.  Here, the state is 
seen to be the logical manifestation of the nation as a functional political 
community within a given territory.  However, it is possible for multi-national 
or multi-ethnic states to function with a relatively high degree of internal 
political harmony if they are able to fairly balance the claims of their 
constituent groups, and recognize the value of group members as more or 
less equal in terms of civic status and material opportunity.   
Similarly, if ethnicity reflects a primordial interest and is accommodated to 
ensure a functional, viable state, then other interests should similarly be 
accommodated between specific interest groups.  That is to say, common 
recognition of a plurality of interests and the accommodation of the most 
basic requirements of these interests are necessary to ensure a successful, 
cohesive state.9  In the case of Aceh and Eelam, a perceived lack of 
recognition of plurality has undermined the cohesion of Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka and fuelled claims to separatism.  
The common problem with ethnic separateness within state borders is that 
where there is political organization, it tends to cohere around (usually 
linguistically defined) ethnic identity and thus causes vertical (geo-ethnic) 
political fault lines.  Such vertical fault lines challenge the wider state-related 
sense of ‘nation’, supplanting it with a more specifically located sense of 
nation, implying the potential for localized nationalist (programmatic) 
assertion in relation to the relevant territory.  That is, a particular ethnic 
group that identifies itself first and foremost in common in relation to a given 
territory could potentially establish a claim to that territory (‘self-
determination’) based on its ethnic specificity.  The implications of ethnic 
                                                 
7
 P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995. 
8
 L. Krader, Dialectic of Civil Society, New York, Prometheus Books, 1976, p 13.   
9
 See Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1905, Book 2.  
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political organization rather than socio-economic political organization is that 
motivating factors have generally been reflected in systems of patronage 
and personal rule, embodying a chauvinist ‘nationalist’ sentiment, rather than 
leadership on the basis of accountability and transparency.  In multi-ethnic 
states, in particular post-colonial states, this has led to the formation of 
political parties that reflect ethnic rather than economic coherence.  Where 
one ethnic group is politically dominant, this often leads to specific ethnic 
domination of state institutions to the detriment of minority communities.  
Elements of this division along geo-ethnic lines can be seen to arise in both 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with ethnic Acehnese and Tamil reluctance to 
accept perceived or actual ethnic Javanese and Sinhalese domination of the 
state.  
Both Sri Lanka and Indonesia have thus undergone significant internal 
political tensions over their incorporation of ethnic minorities into their 
respective states, both of which are unitary.  In the Indonesian case, its early 
nationalists opted for the dual strategy of incorporating all Dutch East Indies 
territories while employing the regional language Bahasa Melayu (market 
Malay) as the national language (Bahasa Indonesia).  The language issue in 
Indonesia was particularly sensitive given its dozen or so major ethnic 
groups and more than 300 minor groups.  The language of the ethnic 
majority Javanese is both complex (with five distinct levels) and explicitly 
hierarchical, which did not suit the state’s early egalitarian and inclusive 
tendencies.  In Sri Lanka, the language issue became problematic when in 
1956 English was replaced as the country’s official language by Sinhalese, 
with Tamil having no official status, hence effectively excluding Tamils from 
official communication.  This policy was nominally reversed in 1987, 
although Sri Lanka retains Sinhalese as the functionally dominant language 
for all ethnic groups.   
A History of Two Conflicts 
Claiming self-determination as a separate political entity, a de facto separate 
Tamil state (‘Eelam’) existed as a manifestation of Tamil political claims from 
2002.  A similar claim to separate statehood also existed in the Indonesian 
province of Aceh, which was resolved with an agreement to grant functional 
self-government (except in functions reserved to the Republic of Indonesia), 
despite Indonesia also having a unitary constitution.  However, the claim to 
separate state status directly challenged the sovereign cohesion of the pre-
existing states and thus led to reciprocal conflict over the last decades.   
Aceh, or more properly Indonesia as a whole, and Sri Lanka share a history 
of colonialism and, prior to the colonial era, did not have a geo-spatial unity 
that has since come to describe the post-colonial states.  Sri Lanka was 
briefly unified under various warring princes up until the 12th century but did 
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not enjoy a voluntary political unity and remained disunited after that time.10  
It was colonized first by Portugal, then Holland and finally the United 
Kingdom.  Large parts of what is now Indonesia, on the other hand, were 
briefly unified in the 14th century under the Majapahit Empire.11  Indonesia 
was colonized by Holland, with Portugal, the United Kingdom and Spain 
coming to colonise other parts of the archipelago.  The pre-colonial 
existence of both demonstrated no linguistic or successful political unity.   
Aceh had been recognized as an independent sovereign state by the United 
Kingdom and the United States in the 19th century,12 a position it claimed 
until invaded by the Netherlands in 1873.  This invasion was resisted until 
1912, although there was sporadic resistance until the Japanese invasion of 
1942.  Acehnese hereafter directly contributed to the 1945-49 war of 
independence against the Dutch, assuming being granted autonomy within a 
loose federated state.  However, in 1950, Indonesia was reconstituted as a 
unitary state and Aceh was subsumed into the province of North Sumatra.  
In response, by 1953 Aceh had risen in revolt, declaring independence from 
Jakarta and joining the Darul Islam rebellion with West Java and South 
Sulawesi.  While the Darul Islam rebellion is generally characterized as 
intended to change the nature of the state rather than to secede from it, 
Aceh’s inclusion reflected a desire to return to at least autonomous status.   
The Darul Islam rebellion ended in defeat in 1962, although with a promise 
of ‘special administrative status’ for Aceh.  However, this was not 
meaningfully put into practice and deeply undermined after the rise of the 
New Order government from 1966.  Following growing economic exploitation 
of Aceh by Jakarta, in 1976, a former Darul Islam leader, Hasan di Tiro, 
declared independence from Indonesia, thus beginning a separatist conflict 
only resolved in 2005.  
As noted by Sitrampalam in relation to Sri Lanka, the development of 
nationalist sentiment during the colonial era was based  
on the foundations of the society’s traditional past.  They saw the modern 
phase of nationalism, not as a novel, essentially different phenomenon, 
causing a break with the past, but rather as an extension of their past, a 
rebirth of the old society, its renaissance in a new form.13 
                                                 
10
 N. Yogasundram, A Conprehensive History of Sri Lanka: From Prehistory to Tsunami, 
Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2006. 
11
 M. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 2002, ch. 2; R. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, London, Curzon, 2000, pp. 86-88.   
12
 A. Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858-1898, Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1969; A. Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the 
End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1979; N. 
Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985. 
13
 S. Sitrampalam, Nationalism, Historiography and Archeology in Sri Lanka – A Perspective, 
Unpublished paper, Thirunelvely, University of Jaffna, undated..  
Security Challenges 
- 98 - Volume 3 Number 2 (June 2007)  
‘Traditional cultural nationalism’ that had not yet developed as a civic identity 
led to an attempted hegemony by the majority ethnic Sinhalese over the 
Tamil and Muslim minorities, which in turn generated conflict as these 
minorities sought to resist such hegemony.14   
In Sri Lanka, Tamil speaking people had been relatively privileged under 
British colonial administration, being generally better educated than the 
Sinhalese majority and employed in government administrative positions.  
As with other multi-ethnic colonial states that favoured an ethnic minority 
over a majority, such as Ruanda, Uganda, or Zimbabwe, when colonialism 
ended in 1949, the ethnic minority lost their privileged position.  In 1956, Sri 
Lanka’s administrative language was changed from English to Sinhalese, 
which alienated many Tamils and led to calls for the establishment of an 
autonomous Tamil region in the north and east of the country.  
By 1972, radicalized Tamils resorted to violence in support of their claims, 
with the precursor group to the LTTE being formed.  In 1978, LTTE attacks 
led to an anti-Tamil Sinhalese riot in which it is believed that up to 3,000 
Tamils were killed.  This swelled the ranks of the LTTE and, along with 
covert training from India and later consolidation of militant Tamil groups, led 
to the formation of a highly developed military organization.  By the mid-
1980s, the LTTE was engaged in full-scale conflict with the government of 
Sri Lanka, occupying the Jaffna Peninsula.  Indian intervention in 1987 
eventually led to conflict between the LTTE and the Indian army, concluding 
with the Indian army withdrawing in 1990.  Conflict has continued, with 
pauses, since that time.   
Similarities and Differences between Aceh and Eelam 
While all states are different – such difference is implied in their geo-
institutional separation – and all conflicts are specific to their own causes 
and circumstances, some states share commonalities and some conflicts do 
find points of common reference.  Eelam and Aceh share a number of 
commonalities, specifically that they are both parts of colonial unities that did 
not reflect pre-colonial political conditions, that both survive within a unitary 
post-colonial structure, that both have substantial claims to pre-existing 
national identity aspiring to a separate state and which continued to manifest 
as post-colonial national identities, that both have been engaged in a 
seemingly intractable war for self-determination, and that both wars 
established a strategic stalemate.     
Having noted such commonalities, the similarities between the Aceh and 
Eelam conflicts are much tested by their differences.  The first main 
difference between the two is that the Aceh conflict, while reflecting more 
                                                 
14
 N. Wickramasinghe, Ethic Politics in Colonial Sri Lanka 1927-47, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing 
House Pvt Ltd, 1995.   
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conventional claims to nationalism, was motivated by Islamic principles.  The 
Eelam conflict is similarly nationalist, but not clearly inspired by any 
particular religious preference, even though most Tamils are Hindu (a small 
minority are Christian).  Following this, both movements adopted the 
interconnected universalist claims to and rhetoric of self-determination, 
democratisation (variously defined or misunderstood) and human rights.  In 
practical terms, the claims to nationalist self-determination by both provided 
a more significant similarity between them than their different religious 
orientations might have implied.  Following this, both movements also 
appeared to be driven by an adherence to principle and a sometimes 
fatalistic attitude towards dying for one’s cause.    
A more significant ideological difference between the two organizations was 
that while GAM practiced communal living in its liberated zones, the natural 
tendency of its senior members both in Aceh and abroad was to gravitate 
towards small business.  Indeed, GAM’s original leadership largely 
comprised of small businessmen, traders and professionals, and their 
rebellion can in part be seen as opposed to the imposed centralized 
corruption of Jakarta.  However, the conflict quickly produced depredations 
against Acehnese as its principle motivating cause.  Beyond a loose 
orientation towards small business, GAM completely lacked an official 
ideology, except for a relatively late and for some a superficial conversion to 
democracy,15 and was generally politically moderate.  While technically 
hierarchical, its organizational structure was relatively flat and decentralised, 
with field commanders having a high level of operational autonomy, and with 
the reporting process to the political leadership in Stockholm being primarily 
advisory.  The LTTE, on the other hand, had its roots in the student 
movements of the 1970s, was revolutionary and tended towards state 
socialism, although blended with a high proportion of small business activity 
and an in principle acceptance of free market capitalism.16  The LTTE was a 
distinctly hierarchical and highly centralised organization, which formally 
precluded democratic processes on the grounds that it could not afford 
internal dissent in times of war.17  
A further significant difference between the two organizations was that, 
regardless of how one defines the term and whether or not it is a useful 
                                                 
15
 GAM officially endorsed a ‘democratic’ platform in its ‘Stavanger Declaration’ (Aceh-Sumatra 
National Liberation Front (i. e.  GAM), Stavanger, Norway, 21 July 2002), but had not worked 
out a mechanism for a democratic internal structure until a meeting in Stockholm in February 
2005 (at which the author was present).  GAM ‘prime minister’ Malik Mahmud thereafter 
subverted the agreement on the democratic internal selection of candidates for elections, in 
May 2005 moving to appoint candidates in opposition to candidates democratically selected by 
the organization just days before.   
16
 See C Stokke, Tamil Eelam - a De Facto State: Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging 
State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka, Oslo, 
Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, 2005.   
17
 Interview, head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat, Puledevan (one name), Kilinochche, May 11 
2006.   
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descriptor or moral value judgment, the LTTE was widely and increasingly 
proscribed as a terrorist organization, whereas GAM never was.  The 
implication of this was that being associated or working with the LTTE was a 
criminal act in many parts of the world, whereas being associated or working 
with GAM was not.  This in turn had implications for travel, fund raising 
activities, the distribution of aid to sympathetic in-country organizations and 
a host of security-related matters.  This distinction characterized different 
approaches to conflict by GAM and the LTTE.  GAM was always careful not 
to engage in activities that could see it labelled as a terrorist organization, in 
particular the indiscriminate killing of civilians, the use of bombing to create a 
sense of terror, or operations outside its specific field of concern.  The LTTE, 
by comparison, has engaged in indiscriminate attacks, has been credited 
with inventing suicide bombings as a means of specific targeting, and often 
engaged in attacks well outside its principle geographic area of concern.  Its 
general justification has been that such attacks are a legitimate response to 
government attacks within its claimed homeland and that it cannot afford to 
limit its operational capacity by concerns about how it is externally viewed.   
More importantly, and with serious implications for peace processes, GAM 
had significant guerrilla capacity but, with an overall ratio of around 40:1 
(approximately 200,000:5,000)18, never enough to militarily defeat the 
Indonesian military (TNI).  Indeed, GAM was generally only lightly armed 
and struggled to meet its own requirements for armaments and munitions.  
Its core fighters had been trained as specialist combatants in Libya,19 but 
most of its guerrillas were less well trained and equipped.20  The LTTE, on 
the other hand, could field a conventional army of perhaps up to 25,000,21 
was well trained, heavily armed, had a highly functional naval unit (Sea 
Tigers) and even had a small air wing,22 which it used to symbolic effect in 
an air strike on a military air base in Colombo in late March 2007.  By 
comparison, the recently expanded Sri Lanka Armed Forces had perhaps 
158,000 personnel whose training was generally no better and perhaps less 
                                                 
18
 That is, the approximate size of the TNI-AD, or army, and a realistic guesstimate of GAM’s 
strength, which was never officially disclosed to the author but which ranged between an 
‘official’ figure of 3,000 (Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005 [quoted as MoU in the 
following], point 4.2) and various boasts of between 7,000 and 15,000 (different members of 
GAM commenting, in Stockholm and Helsinki, at different times between February and August 
2005).  
19
 This was acknowledged to the author by then GAM spokesman Bakhtiar Abdullah, who had 
been in the first intake to Libya in 1986 and stayed for four years as a senior trainer (various 
discussions, February – August 2005).  
20
 Based on discussions with US journalist William Nessen, who spent several weeks traveling 
with GAM, Kuala Lumpur, March 2006, and the limited experience of the author with GAM 
fighters in the field.   
21
 This number was hinted at by an LTTE cardre traveling with the author, but not confirmed.  
Other estimates have put the LTTE’s numbers around 10,000, while Sri Lankan sources have 
quoted figures as low as 800 regular fighters and 2,000 militia (B. Balachandran, ‘Lankan army 
hopes to clear East by March’, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 3 January 2007.).   
22
 Acknowledged to the author by an LTTE captain, Kilinochche, 10 May 2006.   
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than that of the LTTE, which lacked motivation and, while better equipped 
with conventional weapons, ships and planes, did not enjoy a consistent 
advantage in conventional combat.23         
Related to the capacity or otherwise to field conventional military forces was 
the state capacity of the respective organisations.  While neither GAM not 
the LTTE could claim to represent a state that was externally regarded as 
legitimate, both did administer significant areas of territory, or ‘liberated 
zones’, and this thus implied some state capacity.  GAM’s ‘state capacity’ 
was limited to local administrative structures based on traditional village 
models,24 limited educational facilities and rudimentary health facilities.  
When GAM fighters needed serious medical treatment, if possible they 
would pay a local doctor or transfer to Malaysia where there was a 
considerable Acehnese community.25  Education, beyond most basic levels, 
was conducted through government funded schools and institutions, both 
inside and outside liberated zones.  
Compared to this most basic level of organizational capacity, the LTTE 
virtually ran a state within a state, and indeed its intention was rather than to 
wait for a negotiated settlement, to establish a de facto independent state.  
Its status was enhanced by the 2002 ceasefire agreement and technical 
control lines which quickly morphed into ‘borders’, complete with immigration 
checks, visas and customs and tax.26  The ‘capital’ of Eelam, Kilinochche, 
was the LTTE’s administrative centre, and hosted a range of institutions 
such as police (including traffic police with speed detection radars – 50 km/h 
within towns and 80 km/h outside), three levels of courts and a detailed legal 
code.27  Other signs of administration included departments of works, public 
transport and fuel, hospitals, asylums, clinics, children’s homes, 
rehabilitation centres, primary and secondary schools and the construction 
of a proposed university.28   
Elements in Favour of Resolution in Aceh… 
The resolution of conflict requires a real interest in achieving peace, the 
intention to do so, and having the capacity to control one’s forces to ensure 
                                                 
23
 This observation is based on the Sri Lanka military’s mixed record in battling the LTTE, 
leading to the establishment of the ‘liberated zone’ in the Vanni.   
24
 D. Kingsbury, ‘Islam, Democratisation and the Free Aceh Movement’, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, in press 2007; also D. Kingsbury, Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of 
the Aceh Peace Process, Jakarta, Equinox, 2006, pp 184-5.   
25
 Discussions with Mhd. Nur Djuli (later a member of the GAM negotiating team), Kuala 
Lumpur, 2001, 2002.   
26
 Observed by the author, northern Vanni technical control line, 9 May 2006; see also Stokke, 
op. cit.; R. Gopalakrishnan, ‘The Struggle for Tamil Eelam: Very little of Sri Lanka in 
Kilinochche’, Reuters, 2 February 2006.  
27
 LTTE, The Judicial System of Tamil Eelam: Structure Function and Duties of Officials in 
Charge, Kilinochche, ANBU Printing Press, 2004.   
28
 Observed by the author, 9 – 14 May 2006.   
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that peace can be implemented and sustained.  When considering the option 
of a negotiated peace in Aceh, GAM’s political leadership was asked by the 
author whether it was prepared to accept anything less than full 
independence.  This was predicated upon the first principle question of what 
independence was intended to achieve.  Once having established what 
purpose independence was intended to serve, it was then possible to ask 
whether that purpose could be achieved by means other than 
independence.29  Similarly, during the negotiations process, the author put 
the question to the Indonesian government that if the integrity of the state 
was its principle goal, could this be achieved by means other than imposing 
a constrained unitary state, which in this case only allowed political parties 
that had wide representation to participate in elections, precluding locally 
based parties.30  This then went back to questions about the principle 
purpose of the state, and whether such constraints were necessary to 
maintain state unity.  Finally, GAM was a significantly united organisation 
and while it could not claim demonstrated widespread representation within 
Aceh, it could claim a monopoly on the means of violence by pro-self 
determination forces.   
There were also strategic considerations by both sides to be taken into 
account.  The strategic reality for GAM in 2004 was that, as an organization, 
it had suffered serious reversals under a heavy renewed military campaign 
launched in May 200331.  While GAM’s numbers were not seriously 
depleted, its access to sources of food, medicine and ammunition was 
constrained, damaging the morale of its fighters and their capacity to sustain 
their military claims, much less hold on territory.32  Similarly, with a 
population of a little over four million, Aceh comprised less than two per cent 
of the population of Indonesia (ca. 230 million).  However, the strategic 
situation was not entirely in the government’s favour.  The TNI had shown 
that while it was capable of inflicting suffering on GAM, it did so primarily by 
inflicting suffering on the people of Aceh.  This had the effect of driving more 
recruits into the arms of GAM, strengthening it at the time it was under 
heaviest attack.  Similarly, the TNI had shown, over almost 30 years of 
conflict that its military approach was unable to end the guerrilla campaign.  
While it had damaged GAM, the organization was by no means defeated, 
and had demonstrated in the past great capacity to come back strongly from 
previous reversals.  In this sense, while GAM survived it was in fact winning.   
Having noted GAM’s capacity to survive and to regenerate, by 2004 it had 
also become clear that GAM simply did not have the military capacity to win 
                                                 
29
 This is based on four days of discussion between the author and the GAM senior political 
leadership in Stockholm, 27-30 October 2004.  
30
 Discussion between the author and head of the Indonesian negotiation team to the Helsinki 
peace talks, Justice Minister Hamid Awaluddin, Jakarta, 23 March 2005.   
31
 This was only acknowledged by senior GAM figures, and then still privately, to the author 
following the signing of the MoU.   
32
 Discussion with Nessen, op. cit.  
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independence outright through military means, and that there was no 
international support for Aceh’s independence, which precluded any possible 
international settlement in that direction (e.g. as in East Timor).  Balanced 
against this, the Indonesian government also needed to exercise control 
over the TNI.  The TNI had long been a political and economic power in its 
own right, was engaged in widespread corrupt and illegal activity, and was 
only nominally under civil authority.33  Statements made by President 
Yudhoyono indicated that civil authority over the TNI was one of the key 
objectives of his presidency.34  To achieve that, he needed to separate the 
TNI from its sources of income in Aceh and to reduce the TNI’s claim to 
being guardian of the state.  Added to this was that, set against a tight 
budgetary environment, the cost of the Aceh campaign was believed to be 
unsustainable.35  The conflict also had the effect of scaring off potential 
foreign investors, especially in hydrocarbon industries such as those in 
Aceh.  This had the effect that Indonesia had gone from being a net oil 
exporter to becoming a net oil importer, at a time of world record high oil 
prices.  Further, the lack of foreign direct investment approximated the gap 
between Indonesia’s economic growth, at around 4.5 per cent, and 
population growth, meaning that per capita GDP was declining rather than 
growing which, based on relatively steady incomes, meant increased 
unemployment.  Hence Yudhoyono needed a resolution to the Aceh conflict 
for a number of pressing reasons, as well as just showing that Indonesia 
could resolve its internal problems and make a stronger claim to being a 
nation as well as a state.  In this, Yudhoyono could claim a popular mandate 
as Indonesia's first directly elected president and, through strategic alliances 
(including his vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, who was also head of Golkar, the  
largest party in the legislature), could rely on majority support within the 
Indonesian legislature.   
GAM similarly faced economic difficulties, although of a different type.  Apart 
from having reduced access to supplies, the local and expatriate community 
also had difficulty in funding GAM, while its use of pajak nanggroe (state tax) 
was resented by some and otherwise increasingly difficult to collect.36  In all, 
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GAM’s economic circumstances were considerably reduced, which made 
continuing the conflict difficult, although far from impossible.  Finally, the 
tsunami on 24 December 2004 that devastated most of low-lying Aceh, left 
around 180,000 people dead or missing and many more homeless provided 
significant impetus to a decision by GAM made two days prior to accept an 
invitation to attend talks in Helsinki.   
In the first instance, the tsunami opened the province, which had been 
closed to outsiders since the May 2003, allowing in large numbers of media 
as well as foreign militaries and large numbers of aid organisations.  This 
had the effect of highlighting both the conflict (GAM declared a unilateral 
ceasefire immediately following the tsunami, although the TNI continued its 
operations) and the necessity of ending it to allow relief work to go ahead 
unhindered.  While the TNI was initially reluctant to allow in foreigners, the 
extent of the disaster was such that the Indonesian government was unable 
to cope and quickly gave in to foreign pressure.  Similarly, while a TNI 
function was supposed to be development and emergency relief, it was 
overwhelmed by the scope of the disaster and, according to some aid 
agency reports,37 even slowed down the shipment of supplies to disaster 
areas and imposed ‘taxes’ on goods being shipped (consistent with its 
common ‘revenue’ raising methods).  
If both sides wished to see an end to the conflict, they had been trapped by 
their own absolutist rhetoric and the intensity of the conflict.  The tsunami 
acted as a circuit-breaker to these impediments, and allowed them to 
assume the high moral ground in seeking peace (despite the TNI continuing 
its offensive campaign throughout the peace process).  On the part of GAM, 
too, there was also a sense that ‘the people of Aceh have suffered 
enough’.38  Finally, once the attention of the international community was 
turned to Aceh, not least through media access, there was a view that both 
sides should compromise to reach a negotiated settlement.39   
In peace processes there are usually elements that militate against a 
resolution, which might undermine the process itself or could undermine any 
resolution that is achieved.  In Aceh, the main problem following the signing 
of the peace agreement in August 2005 was that the enabling legislation 
was passed four months after the agreed date, in July 2006, and that it 
compromised a number of elements, in particular removing the Acehnese 
legislature’s power of veto on state legislation concerning Aceh, the method 
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of allocation of income from natural resources, and other issues of central 
control.40  However, sufficient of the original agreement remained, in 
particular a freeing of local political opportunity, to allow GAM to continue 
with the peace process.  While the incomplete implementation of the peace 
agreement (Memorandum of Understanding - MoU) was problematic, more 
so was the continuing presence of what were claimed by GAM41 to be an 
unnecessarily high number of TNI and police.  14,700 troops and 9,100 
police were to remain stationed in Aceh,42 which was around double the 
usual number for a military command area or a province.43  Further, both TNI 
and police had trouble in accepting the changing circumstances, and both 
continued to engage in illegal activity in the province, to the detriment of 
local people.44  Associated with this was a lingering sense of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism on the part of the Indonesian government, if not on the part 
of the executive branch then certainly in elements of the legislature and the 
bureaucracy.45  Finally, while the MoU did allow Aceh some degree of 
political autonomy, questions remained as to how adequately this addressed 
the underlying sense of Acehnese national identity, and the relationship 
between such an identity, self-determination and claims for an independent 
state.46  While this did not appear to be likely to undermine the peace in 
Aceh,47 it did provide a continuing backdrop of nationalist assertion that had 
the capacity to again test the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta in the 
future.   
… and Elements Militating against Resolution in Elam 
By way of comparison, in Sri Lanka the issues of interest, intention and 
capacity were and remain more complex.  Indonesia was constructed of 
dozens of significant minorities (along with hundreds of small minorities and 
one majority) and hence incorporating minority concerns (even if that has 
been incomplete) is critical to state success.  In Sri Lanka, however, there is 
one large majority—Sinhalese (ca. 70 per cent)—and two significant 
minorities, one being Muslim (ca. seven per cent) and the other Tamil (ca. 
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15 per cent.48  Within the Sinhalese majority there was a tendency towards a 
national chauvinism,49 underpinned by the dominant religion of Buddhism, 
which occupies the state’s ‘foremost place’.  While some Buddhist clergy 
and leaders have worked for peace efforts, others from its monastic order 
have been religiously assertive and in some cases combative.  In this, the 
view is that the country of Sri Lanka is a global repository of Buddhist values 
and hence must be maintained as wholly Buddhist.  Within this world view, 
Hindu Tamils and Muslims (also mostly Tamil) are an unwanted intrusion 
and should preferably convert to Buddhism or otherwise subsume their 
sense of difference.  Although geographic proximity worked against the 
LTTE—with the exception of the Jaffna Peninsula, most Tamil areas are 
easily accessible from the rest of Sri Lanka—the relative size of the Tamil 
population and its concentration, especially in the north and to a lesser 
extent the east—created a viable state alternative to the Sinhalese 
dominated Sri Lankan state.  Similarly, the LTTE had a monopoly on the use 
of violence, and hence imposed unity upon the claims to Tamil self-
determination.     
Finally, while the 2004 tsunami had a serious impact on Sri Lanka, with 
some 30,000 being killed, it did not draw in foreigners relative to local 
population to the extent of Aceh, nor did it act as a catalyst for peace.  
Rather, the tsunami and the aid flows associated with its relief acted to 
further entrench divisions within the state, especially over the allocation and 
control of the flow of aid.   
The impediments to a negotiated resolution in Sri Lanka were thus more 
profound.  From the perspective of the LTTE, there was a clear lack of trust 
in the intentions of the Sri Lanka government to genuinely pursue peace.50  
This was supported by escalating attacks by Government forces over 2006, 
in particular from May.  These attacks were formalised by the announcement 
at the beginning of January that the Government of Sri Lanka intended to 
seek a military solution to the LTTE issue.51  Moreover, while Indonesia had 
been moving towards an increasingly democratic system, Sri Lanka 
appeared to be moving away from open democratic processes and towards 
a type of bureaucratic authoritarianism.52  While an outcome that promoted 
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democratization and political devolution could work in Aceh, it appeared to 
have little real hope in Sri Lanka, due to the extensive powers of the 
executive president who was, almost by default, an ethnic Sinhalese.53   
Related to the LTTE's state capacity was its military capacity, which 
challenged that of the Sri Lanka military in various military operations.  That 
is to say, while it seemed unlikely that the LTTE could win a war outright 
against the Sri Lanka government (it has not done so to date), it did appear 
to have the capacity to take and hold significant territories, and that if the 
LTTE felt pressure, then it was pressure of a similar type felt by the Sri 
Lanka Government and its military.  In this, the relatively even matching of 
the two sides, if not in numbers then in capacities, did not introduce the 
disequilibrium that pushed one side into a position of seeking a negotiated 
settlement.54   
While there have been expressions of interest within the Sri Lankan 
government in a negotiated settlement, entering genuine negotiations—
those that will fundamentally alter the nature of the Sri Lankan state—is 
exceptionally difficult in Colombo.  Sri Lanka’s legislature has been 
controlled by a series of coalitions around one of two major parties.  
Although the two major, almost exclusively Sinhalese parties (United 
National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom Party) dominate, neither is able to 
command an absolute majority in its own right, and hence both are 
vulnerable to losing the legislative majority.  Further, both have tended to try 
to ‘outbid’ each other with nationalist Sinhalese rhetoric.  Any government 
that goes down the path of compromise with the LTTE thereby opens itself 
to attack by opposition parties, or indeed by minor coalition partners, and 
hence is likely to be undermined in office.  This then acts as a structural 
political impediment to the legislature pursuing or accepting a negotiated 
settlement.  Similarly, while Sri Lanka has an executive president, he or she 
must still rely on the legislature for the passage of enabling legislation and 
may similarly be undermined in office, assuming a prior intention to 
                                                                                                                   
 
president, who appoints ministers as well as the Supreme Court judges who decide on 
constitutional issues.  The role of the prime minister has since become increasingly ceremonial.  
The president appoints, among others, the defence minister, who was from late 2005 an army 
brigadier-general and brother of the president.  Parliamentary politics continues in Sri Lanka, 
although the use of army-linked death squads (see Human Rights Watch, Complicit in Crime: 
State Collusion in Abductions and Child recruitment by the Karuna Group, 24 January 2007), 
torture and denial of habeus corpus, contribute to an increasingly constrained political climate.  
(USAID Mission in Sri Lanka, Democracy and Governance Program, Democracy and 
Governance Program Initiative, 2006).     
53
 The organization of Sri Lanka’s political parties and the voting patterns of its citizens have 
ensured that ethnic Sinhalese parties dominate the parliament, if not always in mutual 
agreement, and that the executive president has, to date, been Sinhalese.   
54
 The LTTE had offered a negotiated settlement, around a federated state model, but this was 
not engaged with by the Government of Sri Lanka.  In 2006, this offer was effectively withdrawn 
as intended talks collapsed or failed to start.   
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compromise.  The change in Sri Lanka’s constitution to a powerful executive 
presidency occurred only in 1978 and despite the previous president, 
Chandrika Kumaratunga, promising a return to a Westminster system, she 
did not push such constitutional change and her successor, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, has also not expressed interest in doing so.     
Since December 2005, the Sri Lanka government has taken a significantly 
more belligerent attitude towards the LTTE, escalating its attacks via proxy 
‘militia’ (including the so-called Karuna faction)55 and engaging in direct 
kidnappings, murders and assaults.  Somewhat in contrast to this more 
belligerent approach, in early 2006, President Rajapaksa also formed an 'all 
party' conference (but not including the LTTE) to try to develop a political 
formula that could be used as a basis for negotiations with the LTTE.  The 
work of this conference was continuing at the time of writing, although with 
little advance.  Both sides have, since the ceasefire of 2002, also upgraded 
and stockpiled weapons ahead of a new round of fighting, with both sides 
exhibiting a more belligerent attitude, both in rhetoric and action.   
The Sri Lanka government has sought to again control all of the territory of 
the state prior to negotiations.  Its claims to continuing support for the 2002 
ceasefire have been rendered meaningless by events in 2006, and 
comments by influential figures in Colombo appear to confirm that it no 
longer seeks a genuinely negotiated settlement, but rather that it wishes to 
impose its own interpretation of what constitutes a settlement.  Similarly, the 
LTTE has in 2006 sought to expand its territorial control56, especially to 
areas claimed as Tamil homeland, to be able to negotiate its claims from a 
position of relative strength.57  That is, both sides have resumed and 
escalated the conflict and both are seeking an effective military victory, or to 
be able to negotiate from a position of strength.     
Further impediments to a successfully negotiated peace included the 
historical memory (or myth) of pre-colonial status or separation, distinct 
‘national’ identities, and the relative artificiality of the post-colonial state.  
That Sri Lanka was constructed as a unitary state, when a federal state 
would have more usefully accommodated its different national interests, was 
fairly clearly an error of late colonial administration.  However, attempts to 
move away from a unitary model have, to date, foundered on the 
requirement to change the constitution and the implications this would have 
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for a common Sinhalese desire for geographic unity.  Finally, resolution was 
only available through negotiation, and the capacity of the LTTE to negotiate 
was severely limited by the serious illness (and, in December 2006, death) 
of its chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham.  It was his illness and inability to 
attend negotiations in 2006 aimed at de-escalating violence that could in 
significant part be held responsible for their failure.      
Conclusions 
Both the conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka showed that where the state was 
perceived to have failed in its civic responsibility towards an ethnically 
distinct and geographically coherent minority, that minority could retreat to or 
create more localized conceptions of nation.  In turn, this ‘nation’ could seek 
territorial independence, that is a state, through which to represent its 
political claims.  This then created a separatist agenda which, as a challenge 
to the pre-existing state’s sovereign authority, led to conflict.  Resolution to 
such conflict in part rested on partially acknowledging the evolved legitimacy 
of such a separatist claim and, by way of compromise, allowing for some of 
that claim to be manifested in practice as autonomy or federation.  Such 
compromise implicitly recognised the government’s obligation to manifest its 
civic responsibilities not just as a sovereign authority but as a civic 
guarantor.  In cases where the state has a poor civic record, external 
monitors can help ensure compliance with such a process.   
In the above respect, the Aceh conflict was resolved by the government of 
Indonesia agreeing to allocate to the people of Aceh a degree of genuine (as 
opposed to the previously offered nominal) political autonomy, within what 
was becoming a loose unitary structure.  In particular, the Indonesian 
government agreed to allow for the creation of local political parties and 
accepted local independent candidates for political office in Aceh.  These 
potentially gave substance to other claims of autonomy,58 by advocating and 
representing local political wishes as opposed to being a branch office of a 
Jakarta-based party.  This was the key to achieving peace in Aceh, and 
while other elements of the MoU were important, the whole agreement 
would have succeeded or failed on this single issue.  Indeed, it was the last 
matter to be negotiated by the two teams at the peace talks and prior to its 
conclusion appeared to be the one issue that would result in the negotiations 
failing.59   
There were two further elements which helped secure the Aceh peace.  The 
first was international promises of support and supervision of the peace 
process, in particular through the European Union-led Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM).  While there were numerous criticisms of the performance of 
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the AMM,60 it did generally fulfil its main functions, not least of which was 
supervising GAM’s disarmament.  The second was the relative success of 
Indonesia’s shift from procedural to increasingly substantive democracy, the 
scope within this for local democratic outcomes, and the dedication of then 
recently elected President Yudhoyono to what might be described as a civic 
national project, as opposed to the imposed ‘nationalism’ of his 
predecessors.61  
By the end of 2006, when the people of Aceh were going to the polls for the 
first time in three decades in a state of peace and, for the first time ever, able 
to elect a locally constituted candidate, the ceasefire that had endured in Sri 
Lanka from 2002 no longer functionally existed and the country was plunged 
back into an undeclared war.  The LTTE’s offer of a federal solution, based 
on unified northern and eastern provinces, was withdrawn at this time as it 
again called for a completely independent state.62  Where the AMM had 
been relatively successful in its mission, Sri Lanka had the experience of the 
intervention of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which resulted in it battling 
the LTTE and eventually and somewhat ignominiously withdrawing.  The 
current (at time of writing), very much smaller and unarmed Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), established to oversee the 2002 Cease Fire 
Agreement, was unable to prevent Sri Lanka’s slide back into conflict.  While 
all such agreements require the active support of all combatant parties,63 the 
SLMM lacked the resources or political capacity to impose its will on the 
combatant parties.  Any future monitoring mission would, like the AMM, 
require the explicit support of a major international body, such as the 
European Union, prepared to impose its will (e.g. through economic 
sanctions) should parties to an agreement break it.64  
Beyond this considerable problem with monitoring and safeguarding a 
peace, there was little doubt that even if the LTTE could be militarily 
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defeated, which has not happened to date, there would continue to be a less 
organized but still deadly Tamil resistance and that Sri Lanka would not 
experience peace without giving substantive recognition to the separate 
political identity of its Tamil people.  To that end, and despite the 
constitutional and political impediments, there needed to be an acceptance 
by all parties in Colombo that any meaningful answer to Sri Lanka’s conflict 
lay in acceptance of a compromise, including the broad principles of self-
determination, which in application implied a version of a two-state policy, in 
which the people of the north and east voted on unity of their provinces 
ahead of an interim administration.  This would create the possibility of a 
further vote on simple federalism or confederation under a limited uniting 
structure within the context of agreement on establishing a pluralistic 
democratic framework in Sinhala Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam.  Such an 
overarching structure would have responsibility for immigration, customs, 
external affairs and key infrastructure, but devolve authority in most other 
areas to self-governing states.  The question of defence would, of course, 
need to be carefully handled, probably on the basis of separate forces for an 
interim period and only later a united force based on recognition of its 
separate origins.   
None of this would be likely, or possible, without significant international 
pressure to adopt such measures and support for them once adopted.  This 
would imply, among other measures, a more substantial version of the 
existing SLMM, the promise of extra aid and the threat of sanctions on either 
party should they break the agreement.  Equally important, Sri Lanka 
needed to return to being a more substantive democracy, working gradually 
back towards a notion of civic nationalism in which equity under rule of law 
rather than ethnicity was the effective basis for a sense of inclusion and 
participation.  After perhaps generations, a sense of normalcy and unity 
might return to Sri Lanka, but not before and not without deep and far 
reaching changes.  At the time of writing, such an outcome appeared to be 
further away than ever, and even starting down such a path appeared 
littered with almost insurmountable obstacles.  But the LTTE had previously 
made official its agreement, in principle, to accept some version of a federal 
solution as opposed to complete independence, while there were practical 
limits to Sri Lanka’s continuing capacity to pursue a conflict it could not 
possibly hope to win.   
In a practical sense, the LTTE’s creation of a state within a state was a 
concrete step towards the realization of its aims, and its functional 
acceptance by the Sri Lanka government via the 2002 ceasefire agreement 
confirmed there was a starting point for compromise.  But perhaps, more 
than anything, the events of 2006 and into 2007 demonstrated that there 
was little taste for compromise in Sri Lanka, and both sides appeared quite 
willing to shed much more blood before they would, exhausted and depleted, 
return to the negotiating table.    
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